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Abstract 
 
This paper investigates the factors that explain the voting cohesion of the United 
States (US) and the European Union (EU) on foreign policy issues in the United Nations 
General Assembly (UNGA). It is often argued that the EU and the US are simply too 
different to cooperate within international organizations and thus to vote the same 
way, for example, in the UNGA. However, there is still a lack of research on this point 
and, more importantly, previous studies have not analyzed which factors explain EU-
US voting cohesion. In this paper, I try to fill this gap by studying voting cohesion from 
1980 until 2011 on issues of both ‘high’ politics (security) and ‘low’ politics (human 
rights)  not only as regards EU-US voting cohesion, but also concerning  voting 
cohesion among EU member states. I test six hypotheses derived from International 
Relations theories, and I argue that EU-US voting cohesion is best explained by the 
topic of the issue voted upon, whether an issue is marked as ‘important’ by the US 
government,  and  by  the type of resolution. On the EU level, the length of Union 
membership and transaction costs matter most. 
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Introduction: explaining voting cohesion in the UN 
 
Since the Second World War, the United States (US) has played an important role in 
the reconstruction of Europe and has stimulated European integration. Today, the 
transatlantic relationship is still strong. However, some scholars argue  that the 
European Union (EU)  and the US are too different to understand each other and 
therefore unable to agree on foreign policy issues.1  Transatlantic  cohesion  would 
enlarge the economic, geographical and political weight of the European Union on 
the world stage and could make it more effective in multilateral organizations.2 
Whether the EU and the US are indeed too different is studied by looking at 
transatlantic cooperation in international organizations, for example in the United 
Nations  General Assembly (UNGA).  Cooperation is studied by measuring voting 
cohesion, that is, whether the US and the EU member states vote the same way on 
UNGA resolutions. Previous research has produced mixed results on this EU-US voting 
cohesion. Moreover, the current literature has failed to explain why the EU and the 
US vote together or not. In this paper, I answer the following question: Which factors 
determine EU-US voting cohesion on foreign policy issues in the United Nations 
General Assembly? 
 
In order to fully explain EU-US voting cohesion, both the cohesion between the United 
States and the European Union and voting cohesion within the EU (that is between 
the 27 member states) will be taken into account. Knowing what can explain why 
member states vote together can also provide insights into why the EU votes 
cohesively with the United States or not. Based on International  Relations 
approaches and European integration theories, six possible explanatory factors are 
identified and formulated as hypotheses. To study EU-US voting cohesion, the 
influence of the issues voted upon, whether an issue is marked as ‘important’ by the 
United States, whether a resolution is ‘new’ or a so-called ‘repeat resolution’ and 
whether it matters who is the president of the US is analyzed. To explain EU voting 
cohesion, the  effects of the  length of Union membership and of  the institutional 
reforms as promoted by the Treaties  of Maastricht, Amsterdam and Lisbon are 
studied. I argue that EU-US voting cohesion is best explained by the topic of the issue 
                                                 
1 For instance, R. Kagan, Paradise and Power: America and Europe in the New World Order, 
London, Atlantic Books, 2003, p. 4. 
2 e.g. R. Ginsberg, Foreign Policy Actions of the European Community, Boulder, Lynne Rienner, 
1989, p. 35; K. Laatikainen, “Pushing soft power: middle power diplomacy at the UN”, in K. 
Laatikainen  & K. Smith (eds.) The European Union at the United Nations: intersecting 
multilateralism, Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan, 2006, pp. 70-92. EU Diplomacy Papers 7/2012 
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voted upon, whether an issue is marked as ‘important’ by the US government, and 
by the type of resolution voted upon. On the EU level, the length of Union 
membership and transaction costs matter most. 
 
My research focuses on a period ranging from 1980 until 2011, which enables me to 
look at the influence of the ‘important’ issues (the US started to mark  certain 
resolutions as important in the 1980s), but also at the influence of the institutional 
reforms of, for example, the Maastricht Treaty. The data I use is an update of Erik 
Voeten’s ‘United Nations General Assembly Voting Data V1’,3 which consists of roll-
call votes.4 The data enables me to determine the level of voting cohesion of the EU 
and the US in  the UNGA. Moreover, it is possible to compare different types of 
resolutions, for example the levels of voting cohesion on more technical, ‘low politics’ 
issues and on ‘high politics’ issues of national sovereignty and identity. In this paper, I 
use resolutions on human rights as representative for ‘low politics’ issues, and 
resolutions on security issues as representative for ‘high politics’ issues.5 In order to 
identify these issues, I use the case selection method developed by Hosli et al.6 which 
is based on keyword searches.7 
                                                 
3 E. Voeten & A. Merdzanovic, “United Nations General Assembly Voting Data”, 2008. 
4  During a roll-call, the numbers of the members of the UNGA are called and the 
representatives reply ‘yes’, ‘no’ or ‘abstention’.  In the literature there is a debate about 
whether roll-call votes are representative for all issues discussed in the UNGA (e.g. C. 
Carrubba, M. Gabel &  S. Hug, “Voting at the surface: roll call votes in the European 
Parliament”, Paper presented at the IEE-ULB, Brussels, 29 April 2009; J. Thiem, Nationale 
Parteien im Europäischen Parlament: Delegation, Kontrolle und politischer Einfluss,  2009, 
Wiesbaden, VS Verlag. Some scholars argue that representatives only ask for a roll-call vote 
when they want to show how cohesive they are on an issue (Carrubba et al., op.cit.). 
However, research is lacking on this point (D. Bearce & S. Bondanella, “Intergovernmental 
organizations, socialization, and member-state convergence”, International Organization, 
vol. 61, no. 4, 2007, pp. 703-733). 
5  See, for instance, M. O’Neill, The politics of European integration: a reader, London, 
Routledge. 
6 M. Hosli, E. van Kampen, F. Meijerink & K. Tennis, “Voting cohesion in the United Nations 
General Assembly: the case of the European Union”, Paper presented at the ECPR Fifth Pan-
European Conference, Porto, 24-26 June 2010. 
7 The keywords used to select the resolutions are: 
Human rights:  “human rights", "elections, effectiveness", "Geneva protocol", "South Africa, 
embargo", "democratic order", "democracy", "right of everyone", "human cloning", "periodic 
and genuine elections", "religions", "Khmer rouge, "death penalty", "children", "torture", "right to 
food", "executions", "execution", "front-line states, assistance", "right to peace", "right of 
peoples to peace", "life in peace", "peace declaration", "displaced persons", "South Africa, 
situation", "civil, political rights", "death sentences", "prostitution", "right to life", "right to housing", 
"South Africa, IMF collaboration", "well-being", "persons who disappeared", "human 
settlements", "credentials", "article 25", "UNRWA", "oppressed people", "inalienable rights", 
"missing persons", "South Africa, oil embargo", "South Africa”, “economic isolation", 
"Kampuchea", "South Africa, assistance to opposition", "UNHCR", "human right", "South Africa, 
membership", "war crimes", "racist", "South Africa, sanctions", "capital punishment", "genocide", Kirsten Lucas 
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Since more than 75 percent of the issues discussed in the UNGA are not put to a 
vote, my results have to be placed in perspective.8  On human rights issues this 
percentage is even 90 percent, while on security issues it is with around 40 percent 
lower. Despite these numbers, from 1980 until 2011 more than 430 resolutions on 
human rights and 820 resolutions on security were passed on the basis of roll-call 
votes in the UNGA, which makes it possible to use statistical methods. 
 
The next section will discuss the literature that has already been published on EU-US 
voting cohesion, but also on EU voting cohesion in international organizations. After 
this, I identify factors that could explain EU-US voting cohesion and formulate six 
hypotheses that will  then be tested.  Finally, I will conclude by discussing some 
implications of my findings. 
 
Literature review 
 
As  set out  in the introduction, I will analyze both voting cohesion between the 
European Union and the United States and voting cohesion between the EU member 
states in order to fully answer the research question. In this section, I review the 
literature that has already been written on these topics. 
 
EU-US voting cohesion 
 
The relationship between the United States and the European Union in international 
organizations  has been studied by a number of researchers. Much of this work 
concerns the UNGA because it offers an opportunity to analyze vote coordination 
on foreign policy matters in a quantitative way. Kim and Russett, for example, have 
                                                 
"freedom", "repression", "refugees", "imprisonment", "forced labor", "racial", "Indians in South 
Africa, "apartheid", "rights of", "globalization", "minorities", "prisoners of war", "racism", 
"discrimination", "women". 
Security:  "warfare", "military installations", "armaments", "missiles", "missile", "Bosnia and 
Herzegovina", "verification", "South Atlantic", "remnants of war", "US-USSR", "confidence-
building", "peacekeeping", "durable peace", "Iraq", "mercenaries", "non-use of force", 
"prohibition, use of force", "religious intolerance", "terrorism", "Indian Ocean", "Cuba", "Korea", 
"US and Soviet relations", "big powers", "Hungary", "Tibet", "peaceful", "armistice", "Suez", 
"aggression", "Korean question", "nuclear", "arms", "security", "weapons", "rearmament", 
"disarmament", "fissionable material". 
8 M. Peterson, The UN General Assembly, New York, Routledge, 2006, p. 74. The fact that the 
majority of issues is not put to vote is partly caused by the rules of procedure of the UNGA. The 
Special Committee on the Rationalization of the Procedures and Organization of the General 
Assembly recommended that “delegations should endeavor not to request such a vote [a 
roll-call vote] except when there are good and sound reasons for doing so”. See UN, ”Rules of 
Procedure”, 2011, Annex IV, art. 84. EU Diplomacy Papers 7/2012 
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observed that during the 1980s and the early 1990s, France, Germany, the UK and 
the Benelux countries could be seen as the closest and most reliable allies of the 
United States.9 According to Fassbender, little has changed for the UK and France 
who still “often [align] themselves with the United States, emphasizing their role and 
rank as ‘great powers’”.10 Other scholars see a significant change over the years, 
though. Johansson-Nogués finds that the “EU convergence with the USA in the UN 
General Assembly is in overall decline”.11  And Voeten shows that  although 
compared to other big powers, France and the UK were in the 1990s still the closest 
to the US, the preferences of these two countries have been moving away from the 
American interests.12 This finding is also supported by Luif:  
The distance between the EU consensus and the United States was small 
in 1979, but during the ‘Second Cold War’ this distance increased; it did 
not diminish immediately after the end of the Cold War. Only during the 
Clinton administration did it decrease somewhat, to rise again from 2000 
on.13  
 
Here I see a gap in the literature. First, many studies have focused on the distance of 
preferences  or voting behaviour  between  the EU member states and the US. 
However, the distance between the Union (taken as a whole, with all member states 
included) and the US is not often measured.14 Besides, recent data on EU-US voting 
cohesion,  especially after  the EU enlargements of 2004 and 2007,  is lacking. 
Therefore, an overview on whether a transatlantic divergence in interests  exists  is 
missing.  
 
Second, some scholars have failed to analyze whether these different preferences 
also lead to dissimilar voting behaviour.15  This is problematic  since  countries  with 
different preferences will not necessarily also vote in different directions. States may 
decide not to vote in line with their preference  on a single issue, for example 
because they have made a trade-off on other issues. This leads to another point of 
                                                 
9 S. Kim & B. Russett, “The new politics of voting alignments in the United Nations General 
Assembly”, International Organization, vol. 50, no. 4, 1996, pp. 639-642. 
10 B. Fassbender, “The better peoples of the United Nations? Europe’s practice and the United 
Nations”, The European Journal of International Law, vol. 15, no. 5, 2004, p. 862. 
11 E. Johansson-Nogués, “The fifteen and the accession states in the UN General Assembly: 
what future for European foreign policy in the coming together of the ‘old’ and the ‘new’ 
Europe?”, European Foreign Affairs Review, vol. 9, no. 1, 2004, p. 74. 
12 E. Voeten, “Resisting the lonely superpower: responses of states in the United Nations to US 
dominance”, The Journal of Politics, vol. 66, no. 3, 2004, pp. 742-744. 
13 P. Luif, “EU cohesion in the UN General Assembly”, Institute for Security Studies, no. 49, 2003, 
p. 38. 
14 Here the only exception is Johansson-Nogués, op.cit.   
15 e.g. Voeten, “Resisting the lonely superpower”, op.cit. Kirsten Lucas 
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criticism: Kim and Russett have looked at voting behaviour and have, based on 
these votes, identified the preferences of member states.16 I would argue that this is 
not the right sequence since preferences are formulated before the actual voting 
takes place, and there may be a gap between preferences and voting behaviour.  
 
Third, the existing studies have not tried to explain why the EU member states and the 
US have different interests, although  this question is much more interesting  than 
simply measuring whether a difference exists. The only exception is a study 
conducted by Birnberg: she found that EU member states “disagree more often in 
the face of transatlantic divergence compared to transatlantic convergence”.17 In 
order to explain why, Birnberg analyzed  the  strength of the bilateral transatlantic 
relationship in the political, economic and cultural areas.  Strong economic and 
cultural transatlantic ties of an EU member state make ‘vote defection’, that is a 
different vote than the EU majority, more likely. With political transatlantic ties, this is 
not the case.18  However, more specific explanations, such as the influence of  US 
President Bush jr., or of the issue area discussed, are not tested. In this paper, I will 
take these factors into account. 
 
EU voting cohesion 
 
The same criticism – a lack of explanations – also applies to the studies of EU voting 
cohesion. A lot of attention has been paid to whether or not the Union speaks with 
one voice in international organizations, although the conclusions differ.19 Hosli et al. 
and Luif have shown that over a long period of time EU cohesion levels have 
increased, while Jakobsson has found a decrease.20 And, as I have said before, the 
studies did not succeed in explaining satisfyingly why voting cohesion levels have 
increased or decreased. Both Luif and Hosli et al. studied whether EU voting cohesion 
in the UNGA depended on the issue areas discussed and found that voting cohesion 
is higher on more technocratic issues.21 However, both studies fail to address whether 
                                                 
16 Kim & Russett, op.cit. 
17  G.  Birnberg, “The voting behavior of the European Union member states in the United 
Nations General Assembly”, Ph.D. thesis submitted to the Department of Government of the 
London School of Economics, London, 2009, p. 148. 
18 Ibid., p. 187.  
19 Hosli et al., op.cit.; Luif, op.cit.; S. Meunier, “What single voice? European institutions and EU-
U.S. trade negotiations”, International Organization, vol. 54, no. 1, 2000, pp. 103-135. 
20 Hosli et al., op.cit.; Luif, op.cit.; U. Jakobsson, “An International Actor Under Pressure: The 
Impact of the War on Terror and the Fifth Enlargement on EU Voting Cohesion at the UN 
General Assembly 2000-05”, Journal of Common Market Studies, vol. 47, no. 3, 2009, p. 549. 
21 Hosli et al., op.cit., p. 27; Luif, op.cit., p. 51. EU Diplomacy Papers 7/2012 
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these differences are significant, and both find exceptions to the rule. This means 
that the topic voted upon cannot explain all differences in the levels of voting 
cohesion. 
 
The current literature has not properly analyzed which other factors could explain EU 
voting cohesion. Luif concludes that after the Cold War some of the new EU member 
states quickly adjusted to EU positions, while others did not.22  But how can these 
differences be explained? What is the influence of the length of membership on the 
level of EU voting cohesion?  
 
Data analysis 
 
Before starting with the data analysis, I will give an overview of the development of 
EU-US voting cohesion. Here the following formula is used (as developed by Hosli et 
al.23): Cx = |AVx - 0.5| × 2 × 100 
 
Cx is the cohesion of votes on resolution x and AVx stands for the average vote of 
the EU member states and the US on resolution x (when measuring EU voting 
cohesion,  AVx stands for the average vote of EU member states on resolution x). 
‘Yes’ votes are coded as 1 and ‘no’ votes are coded as 0.  
 
In the literature, there is a discussion about the way of measuring abstain-votes. 
Some scholars place vote choices on an interval scale; a ‘yes’ vote is coded as 1, 
‘no’ as 0 and ‘abstain’ as 0.5.24 This makes it possible to discern the different choices 
a representative in the UN can make. However, the method led to criticism from 
scholars who have coded abstention as a ‘no’ vote, based on the idea that it is 
quite common for UNGA representatives to vote ‘abstain’ on a resolution, while 
meaning ‘no’.25  When measuring voting cohesion, these researchers also assume 
that abstain-votes lead to the same level of cohesion as when members are voting 
‘no’.26 
 
                                                 
22 Ibid., p. 51. 
23 Hosli et al., op.cit. 
24 e.g. Luif, op.cit. 
25 e.g. E. Voeten, “Clashes in the Assembly”, International Organization, vol. 54, no. 2, 2000, 
pp. 185-215;  and  T. Volgy, D. Frazier & R. Ingersoll, “Preference similarities and group 
hegemony: G-7 voting cohesion in the UN General Assembly”,  Journal of International 
Relations and Development, vol. 6, no. 1, 2003, pp. 51-70. 
26 Hosli et.al., op.cit., p. 18. Kirsten Lucas 
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I argue that states only choose to abstain from voting when the UN resolution voted 
upon is not a key issue to them. In other cases states will vote in favour or against a 
resolution. It would therefore be incorrect to assume that an abstain-vote has the 
same weight as a no-vote. Moreover, I do not agree that the level of cohesion is 
automatically the same between abstain-  and no-votes.  When there is disagree-
ment between member states, but they believe that a cohesive Union is needed in 
order to be influential at UN level, countries can choose to abstain. In these cases, 
treating an abstain-vote as a ‘no’ leads to a lower level of voting cohesion then is 
actually the case. Therefore, I measure the votes on an interval scale. In order to 
make sure though that my results are consistent, I will also perform an analysis with 
abstention of voting measured as no-votes. In Figure 1, voting cohesion levels of the 
EU and the EU with the US are included. 
 
Figure 1: Voting cohesion levels in the UNGA 
 
Source: author’s compilation 
 
The graph shows that, generally, EU-US voting cohesion is high. When the abstain-
votes are coded as 0.5, EU-US voting cohesion lies around 86 percent in the period of 
2005-2011. When the abstain-votes are coded as a ‘no’, the level of cohesion is even 
higher, around 92 percent in the same period. Another interesting observation is the 
rapid growth of voting cohesion during the 1980s. In the period of 1985-1989, voting 
cohesion was around 45 to 50 percent, but it grew to more than 80 percent in the 
1990s. Looking at history, the period towards the end of the 1980s, under US President 
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Reagan , is described as the ‘coolest ever’.27 Therefore, it would be interesting to see 
whether a presidential effect is significant. Moreover, in the graph one can observe 
that EU member states seem to ‘abstain’ quite often, which affects that level of EU 
voting cohesion. 
 
In order to find out whether the issues discussed matter for cohesion levels, I have 
also calculated voting cohesion on both human rights and security issues. The results 
can be seen in Figures 2 and 3.  
 
Figure 2: Voting cohesion on human rights issues 
 
Source: author’s compilation 
 
On human rights issues, voting cohesion levels since 1999 were around 95 percent 
(when the abstain-votes  are coded as no-votes). When a difference is made 
between abstain and voting no, EU-US voting cohesion is lower, although in the 
period 2005-2011, one can barely observe a difference. 
 
                                                 
27 G. Lundestad, The United States and Western Europe since 1945, Oxford, Oxford University 
Press, 2003, p. 232. 
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Figure 3: Voting cohesion on security issues 
 
Source: author’s compilation 
 
As Figure 3 shows, voting cohesion levels on security issues were lower; with abstain-
votes coded as 0.5, the level lies around 75 percent in 2005-2011, and with abstain-
votes as ‘no’, the level is 90 percent. On security issues, the EU and the US thus 
diverge slightly. Another interesting conclusion which follows from Figures 2 and 3 is 
that on human rights issues, including the US in the calculations increases the level of 
voting cohesion, while on  security issues, including the US tends to lead to lower 
levels of voting cohesion. 
 
Hypotheses testing 
 
Based on theories of International Relation and European integration, I have derived 
six hypotheses that could possibly explain EU-US voting cohesion in the General 
Assembly.28 
 
   
                                                 
28 For more details, see K. Lucas, “1+1=3? EU-US voting cohesion in the United Nations General 
Assembly”, Master’s thesis, Bruges, College of Europe 2012, pp. 15-27. 
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Hypothesis 1: issue areas  
 
Figures 2 and 3 indicate that there is a difference in the levels of voting cohesion 
between human rights and security issues, as was suggested by intergovernmentalists 
such as Stanley Hoffmann: he argued that cooperation is possible in technocratic 
areas (‘low politics’), but impossible on issues over autonomy (‘high politics’).29 
However, as is pointed out by critics of his theory,30  high politics areas are not 
immune for cooperation, but it is more difficult. The graphs, though, do not tell 
whether there is a significant  difference  between high and low politics issues. 
Therefore, the following hypothesis based on intergovernmentalism was tested: 
 
H1: issue area hypothesis: Voting cohesion is stronger in areas of low politics than on 
issues of high politics. 
 
In order to compare the levels of voting cohesion, I have created two groups within 
each voting cohesion index: the levels of voting cohesion on the low-politics issue of 
human rights and on the high-politics issue of security. An  independent  t-test is 
performed on the two different groups. Looking at the results, on average, voting 
cohesion is higher on low politics issues (M=65.02, SE=1.76) than on high politics issues 
(M=61.53, SE=1.23).  This difference was not significant (with  t(1250)=0.065, p>0.05), 
and the effect size was very small (0.046). When the abstain-votes were coded as 
no-votes, the null hypothesis had to be rejected; the variances between voting 
cohesion on low politics and high politics  issues are significantly different, which 
means that the assumption of homogeneity of variances was violated. The results 
show that, again, voting cohesion is higher on low politics issues (M=73.89, SE=1.36), 
than on high politics issues (M=67.04, SE=1.16). This difference was significant (with 
t(1011.63)=0.000, p<0.01), with an effect size of 0.12, which is relatively small since the 
effect explains 1.2 percent of the total variance.  
 
Hypothesis 2: salience of resolutions 
 
A second hypothesis that I have tested follows constructivist thinking  and is 
concerned with whether voting is different if the resolutions voted upon are marked 
by the United States as ‘important’ or not. Constructivists believe that states act in a 
                                                 
29 S. Hoffmann, “Obstinate or obsolete? The faith of the nation-state and the case of Western 
Europe”, Daedalus, 1966, vol. 95, no. 3, p. 877. 
30 C. Webb, “Theoretical prospects and problems”, in H. Wallace, W. Wallace & C. Webb 
(eds.) Policy-making in the European Community,  Chichester, John Wiley and Sons, 1983, pp. 
1-42; M. Cini, European Union Politics, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2005, 2nd edn., p. 105. Kirsten Lucas 
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way that is seen as “natural, rightful, expected and legitimate”, the so-called ‘logic 
of appropriateness’.31 Every year, the US government marks certain resolutions that 
will be voted upon in the General Assembly as important. In order to ensure that 
major partners, such as the European Union, support the US, the administration sends 
out lobbyists.32 I expect that this lobbying pays off and that EU member states feel 
obliged to follow the United States, out of this ‘logic of appropriateness’. Therefore, I 
expect higher levels of voting cohesion on the so-called lobbied resolutions than on 
other resolutions. 
 
H2: salience hypothesis: Voting cohesion is stronger on resolutions which the US had 
marked as important than on issues without this label. 
 
In order to test this hypothesis, I have again performed an independent t-test, for 
which I have created two groups within each voting cohesion index. The first group 
consists of the issues marked as important; the second group does not have this 
label. However, when I tested this hypothesis, two problems appeared: first, the data 
of salient issues is not available for every year.33  Second, the US has marked a 
maximum of 15 resolutions per session in all policy areas. Therefore, in every session, 
only a few resolutions were included in my dataset. This makes the number of cases 
without the ‘important’-label (331) compared to the number of cases with a label 
(68) rather unbalanced. Both problems should be kept in mind when interpreting the 
results. 
 
On average, voting cohesion is higher on the issues that were marked as important 
(M=89.18, SE=3.05) than on issues without this label (M=76.92, SE=1.89). This difference 
was significant (t(124.79)=0.00, p<0.01) with an effect size of 0.29, which is close to a 
medium effect (the threshold generally being  0.3). When the abstain-votes were 
coded as no-votes, the direction of the result was the same; a higher level of voting 
cohesion on important issues (M=96.32, SE=0.77) than on  non-important issues 
(M=90.91, SE=0.88). This difference was, again, significant (t(264.83)=0.00, p<0.01) with 
a small effect size of 0.27. The results indicate that the US is successful in getting its 
close allies to support its position on issues that are seen as vital for American 
interests. 
                                                 
31 J. March and J. Olsen, “The Logic of Appropriateness”, ARENA Working Papers, no. 4, Oslo, 
ARENA, 2009, pp. 3. 
32 Birnberg, op.cit. 
33 The data on salient issues is not available for the years 1984, 1986, 1987, 1989, 1990, 1991, 
1992, 1993, 1995 and 1996. EU Diplomacy Papers 7/2012 
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However, for both tests, the null hypothesis had to be rejected. The assumption of 
homogeneity of variances was violated, and  the variances between voting 
cohesion on important and non-important issues are significantly different. This 
violation could possibly be explained based on the number of years that were 
missing and the unbalanced number of important and non-important issues. 
 
Hypothesis 3: repeat resolution 
 
The third hypothesis that I have tested is again based on constructivism  and 
concerns  the type of resolution.  In the UNGA, certain resolutions are voted upon 
every year. This means that the positions of states are no longer a surprise: countries 
rarely vote in a different direction than the previous year. This means that countries 
can cooperate in the UNGA within relatively full knowledge of each other’s positions 
on those issues. I have not formulated a direction of this hypothesis. One could argue 
that voting cohesion is likely to be stronger on annual resolutions because socializa-
tion takes place, while one could also argue that repeat resolutions do not differ 
from other resolutions because the countries had different positions from the very 
beginning and they will probably not change their positions. 
 
H3: repeat resolution hypothesis: Voting cohesion is different on repeat resolutions 
compared to ‘new’ resolutions. 
 
I have identified the resolutions in my database which are annually voted upon, such 
as on the Mine Ban Treaty. I have created two groups; the first one consists of annual 
resolutions, the second of ‘new’ resolutions. The results show that, on average, voting 
cohesion is lower on annual resolutions (M=62.4404, SE=1.18) than on ‘new’ 
resolutions (M=63.25, SE=1.98). This difference is not significant (t(1253)=0.070, p>0.05)) 
with an a really small effect size of 0.01. When the abstain-votes are coded as ‘no’, 
the results show that, again, voting cohesion is weaker  on annual resolutions 
(M=66.52, SE=1.09) than on ‘new’ resolutions (M=77.33, SE=1.49). Here the difference 
is bigger than when the abstain-votes are coded as 0.5. The difference is significant, 
which means that there is no variance of homogeneity (t(726.49)=0.000, p<0.01)) and 
the effect size is 0.21, which is small. 
 
The results of the t-tests seem to indicate that, indeed, the socialization process within 
the framework of the UNGA is not strong enough for countries to develop a common 
position on issues. On the contrary, if countries start off with a different position, they Kirsten Lucas 
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are unlikely to change it. A possible explanation could be that a switch in position is 
seen as weak and not credible. 
 
Hypothesis 4: blame Bush jr. 
 
Another hypothesis that I have tested concerns the influence of the American 
president on voting cohesion levels. Since in the literature, the influence of Bush jr. on 
transatlantic relations is often discussed,34 I have formulated the following hypothesis: 
 
H4: blame Bush hypothesis: Voting cohesion is lower under the presidency of Bush jr. 
than under other US presidencies. 
 
To find out whether President Bush jr. has truly had a negative influence on voting 
cohesion between the US and the EU, I have created dummy variables for each 
presidential period. The period under President  Carter is taken as the reference 
category, which allows me to find out whether there is divergence and, if so, when it 
has started (under Clinton, or already before, under George H.W. Bush or Reagan) 
and whether the Presidency of Bush  jr.  has worsened the transatlantic divide or 
whether the already existing differences just became more apparent. The dummy 
variables entail the period of Reagan (1981-1989), Bush sr. (1989-1993), Clinton (1993-
2001), Bush jr. (2001-2009) and Obama (since 2009). The period up to each president 
is coded as 0, afterwards it is coded as 1 (until the end of the presidential period). 
After  testing  whether the assumptions of regression were satisfied,35  I have run a 
regression analysis.36 Unfortunately, there is a multicollinearity problem. This refers to 
the situation in which two, or more, predictors are strongly (but not perfectly) 
correlated to each other, which makes interpretation of the strength of the effect of 
each predictor difficult. Therefore, the results have to be treated with care. 
 
In order to make sure that any measured effect is truly caused by the President in 
place, I have created the variable ‘year’ which allows me to control for any time 
effect. In the following tables, the results of the regression analyses are presented: 
 
                                                 
34 For example P. Gordon, “Bridging the Atlantic divide”, Foreign Affairs, vol. 82, no. 1, 2003, 
pp. 1-9; S. Patrick, “Beyond coalitions of the willing: assessing US multilateralism”, Ethics and 
International Affairs, vol. 17, no. 1, 2003, pp. 37-54; M. Hirsch, “Bush and the world”, Foreign 
Affairs, vol. 81, no. 5, 2002, pp. 18-43. 
35 A. Field, Discovering statistics using SPSS, London, Sage Publications, pp. 169-170. 
36 This is a linear model in which one variable or outcome is predicted by a linear combination 
of two or more predictor variables. The model takes the form of 𝑌 𝑖 = (𝑏0 + 𝑏1𝑋1 + 𝑏2𝑋2 + ⋯+
 𝑏𝑛1𝑋𝑛) + 𝜀𝑖 EU Diplomacy Papers 7/2012 
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Table 1: Regression analysis of 
presidential influence (abstain as 0.5)  
Table 2: Regression analysis of 
presidential influence (abstain as 0) 
  B (abstain as 0.5) 
Year  0.495 
(0.449) 
Reagan  0.383 
(5.348) 
Bush sr.  0.852 
(7.163) 
Clinton  21.106* 
(9.107) 
Bush jr.  20.142 
(12.200) 
Obama  16.743 
(14.682) 
Constant  -934.296 
(889.222) 
R Squared  0.155 
Notes: main entries are unstandardized 
coefficients; robust standard errors are in 
parentheses. 
N=1255, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01. 
 
  B (abstain as 0) 
Year  1.014** 
(0.311) 
Reagan  -0.711 
(3.708) 
Bush sr.  14.962* 
(4.966) 
Clinton  33.279** 
(6.314) 
Bush jr.  25.370* 
(8.459) 
Obama  18.707 
(10.179) 
Constant  -1966.144 
(616.536) 
R Squared  0.483 
Notes: main entries are unstandardized 
coefficients; robust standard errors are in 
parentheses. 
N=1255, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01.
Source: author’s compilation 
 
When the abstain-votes  are  coded as 0.5, only the variable Clinton is significant. The 
other variables do not seem to have any explanatory power. Moreover, any change in 
the level of voting cohesion cannot be seen as a time effect since the variable ‘year’ 
was not significant. Overall, the model seems to explain 15.5 percent of the variance in 
voting cohesion (R Squared37). 
 
However, when the abstain-votes  are  coded as no-votes, there seems to be a time 
effect. For each year, EU-US voting cohesion increases with 1.014. In addition, it seems to 
matter who is the President. Quite interesting, the direction of the effect of the variable 
‘Reagan’ is negative, which indicates that voting cohesion is likely to decrease. However, 
this variable is not significant, and therefore does not have enough explanatory power. 
Under Bush sr., Clinton and Bush jr., voting cohesion is likely to increase. This is an 
interesting finding, especially the fact that Bush jr. seems to have a positive effect on 
voting cohesion and thus not the negative effect that is expected by ‘blame Bush’ 
                                                 
37 Statistical measure of how well a regression line approximates real data points or how well future 
outcomes are likely to be predicted by the model. If the R Squared is 1 (100%), there is a perfect 
fit. Kirsten Lucas 
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theorists.  Moreover, the model has improved significantly when the abstain-votes are 
measured as no-votes. Now, I am able to explain almost 50 percent of the variance in 
voting cohesion.  Therefore, the hypothesis needs to be rejected, although the results 
have to be read with caution due to a multicollinearity problem. 
 
Following liberal intergovernmentalists such as Putnam,38 I acknowledge the importance 
of studying the ‘domestic’ level in explaining EU-US voting cohesion. If I find, for example, 
very low levels of EU-US voting cohesion on high politics issues, it could be caused by EU 
member states who try to protect their sovereignty.  Therefore, I will also test two 
hypotheses that can explain why EU member states vote together in the UNGA or not. 
The two hypotheses are selected based on previous research that I have conducted with 
regards to voting cohesion of the European Union in the UNGA.39  
 
Hypothesis 5: length of EU membership 
 
First, I will test a  hypothesis  based on constructivism  and the idea of a socialization 
process, which is concerned with the influence of the length of EU membership on the 
level of voting cohesion. According to constructivists, states can become committed to 
exchanging views, begin to perceive common interests and, in the end, become 
‘socialized’.40 One could imagine that within the European Union, such as ‘socialization 
process’ is taking place and member states start to develop more and more common 
interests over the years. Therefore, I have tested the following hypothesis. 
 
H5: length of membership hypothesis: The longer a country is a member of the EU, the 
more cohesively it votes with the EU bloc in the UNGA. 
 
This hypothesis gives us some insight in the strength of socialization processes within the 
European Union. In the end, countries are expected to develop a ‘co-ordination reflex’,41 
leading to more cohesive voting behaviour at the UN.  
 
To find out whether the length of membership does indeed have an influence on voting 
cohesion within the EU, a variable that measures the length of membership was created. 
                                                 
38 e.g. R. Putnam, “Diplomacy and domestic politics: the logic of two-level games”, International 
Organization, vol. 42, no. 3, 1988, pp. 427-460. 
39 K. Lucas, “United Europe at the United Nations? EU voting cohesion in international organizations 
explained”, Thesis submitted to the Department of Political Science of Leiden University for the 
Degree of Master in Political Science (research), Leiden, 2011. 
40 K. Smith, “Speaking with one voice? European Union coordination on human rights issues at the 
United Nations”, Journal of Common Market Studies, vol. 44, no. 1, 2006, pp. 115-116. 
41 e.g. Birnberg, op.cit., pp. 45-46. EU Diplomacy Papers 7/2012 
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All countries that became members  of the EU  from the 1980s onwards have been 
included. The results are presented in Figure 4. 
 
Figure 4: The length of EU membership and agreement with the majority vote 
 
Source: author’s compilation 
 
Indeed, the percentages show that when the abstain-votes were coded as 0.5, there 
seems to be an upward trend over the years when it comes to voting with the majority. 
The longer a country is a member of the European Union, the more likely it is to agree with 
the majority. When the abstain-votes were coded as no-votes, the figure suggests a 
similar trend, but the effect of the length of membership is weaker. However, the figure 
does not tell whether the length of EU membership has a significant influence on whether 
countries agree with the majority-vote. Therefore, I have run a logistic regression,42 the 
results of which are shown in Tables 3 and 4. 
 
Table 3: Logistic regression analysis on the length of membership (abstain as 0.5) 
 
N=6311, ** = significant at 0.01 level 
B=coefficient, S.E= standard error, Exp (B)=the odds 
ratio 
 
Source: author’s compilation 
                                                 
42  A version of multiple regression (two or more predictor variables) in which the outcome is 
dichotomous (two categories): agreement with the majority or not. 
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Table 4: Logistic regression analysis on the length of membership (abstain as 0) 
 
 
N=6311, ** = significant at 0.01 level 
B=coefficient, S.E= standard error, Exp (B)=the odds 
ratio 
 
Source: author’s compilation 
 
The length of EU membership has a significant  influence on voting cohesion, but the 
influence is relatively small. Being a member for a long time increases the odds of voting 
along with the majority of the EU member states with a factor of 1.032. When the abstain-
votes are coded as ‘no’, the effect becomes even smaller (odds ratio of 1.014). This is an 
interesting finding since constructivist theory “has thus far been somewhat silent about 
precisely how many years are necessary for socialization to emerge and mature”,43 
although in the literature the average expectation of such a socialization process is that it 
takes a minimum of three to four years.44  
 
My results show that indeed socialization is a long-term process because voting cohesion 
only grows very little over the years. A possible explanation could be the ‘ceiling effect’. 
As presented in Figure 1, EU voting cohesion levels have increased over time to almost 95 
percent cohesion when the abstain-votes were coded as 0. This means that there is little 
room for improvement of the voting cohesion levels through institutional reforms. One 
could imagine that, in general, some countries are more likely to follow the majority than 
others, simply because the preference of the majority is closer to their own preference. 
Therefore, I have run another logistic regression in which I have controlled for differences 
among countries. Here only the countries that joined the EU after 1980 have been 
included. The results are reported in Tables 5 and 6. 
 
                                                 
43 D. Bearce & S. Bondanella, “Intergovernmental organizations, socialization, and member-state 
convergence”, International Organization, vol. 61, no. 4, p. 716. 
44 e.g. M. Zürn & J. Checkel, “Getting socialized to build bridges: constructivism and rationalism, 
Europe and the nation-state”, International Organization, vol. 59, no. 4, pp. 1045-1079. 
  B  S.E.  Exp (B) 
Length  0.014  0.005  1.014* 
Constant  1.080  0.043  2.946** EU Diplomacy Papers 7/2012 
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Table 5: Logistic regression analysis 
about the length of membership, 
controlled for country (abstain as 0.5) 
  B  S.E.  Exp (B) 
Length  0.083  0.010  1.087** 
Bulgaria  2.196  0.602  8.988** 
Cyprus  0.589  0.262  1.803* 
Czech 
Republic 
1.377  0.341  3.963** 
Estonia  1.377  0.341  3.963** 
Finland  0.284  0.210  1.328 
Hungary  1.377  0.341  3.963** 
Latvia  0.917  0.290  2.501** 
Lithuania  1.708  0.387  5.516** 
Malta  0.331  0.245  1.393 
Poland  1.286  0.329  3.618** 
Portugal  -0.264  0.177  0.768 
Romania  1.319  0.416  3.739** 
Slovakia  1.476  0.354  4.377** 
Slovenia  1.586  0.369  4.883** 
Spain  0.231  0.191  1.260 
Sweden  -0.249  0.189  0.780 
Constant  1.526  0.154  4.599** 
N=6311, * = significant at 0.05 level, ** = 
significant at 0.01 level 
 
Table 6: Logistic regression analysis 
about the length of membership, 
controlled for country (abstain as 0) 
 
  B  S.E.  Exp (B) 
Length  0.048  0.006  1.049** 
Bulgaria  0.568  0.237  1.765* 
Cyprus  0.384  0.182  1.468* 
Czech 
Republic 
0.625  0.192  1.868** 
Estonia  0.429  0.184  1.536* 
Finland  0.190  0.145  1.209 
Hungary  0.476  0.186  1.610* 
Latvia  0.453  0.185  1.573* 
Lithuania  0.524  0.188  1.689** 
Malta  0.233  0.178  1.262 
Poland  0.549  0.189  1.731** 
Portugal  -0.385  0.126  0.680** 
Romania  0.481  0.232  1.618* 
Slovakia  0.453  0.185  1.573* 
Slovenia  0.524  0.188  1.689** 
Spain  -0.407  0.126  0.665** 
Sweden  0.000  0.142  1.000 
Constant  0.759  0.109  2.136** 
N=6311, * = significant at 0.05 level, ** = 
significant at 0.01 level 
Source: author’s compilation 
 
First,  Tables  5 and 6 show that even when other variables are  entered into the 
regression model, the relationship between the length of EU membership and the 
level of voting cohesion remains  significant. However, the explanatory power of 
length is relatively small. For each year of EU membership, the odds of voting with the 
majority increase with a factor of 1.049. Second, regardless of how the abstain-votes 
are coded, there are differences between countries when it comes to voting with 
the majority. For example, Lithuania is 5.5 times more likely to vote with the majority 
than Austria (when the abstain-votes are coded as 0.5). Portugal, on the other hand, 
is less likely to agree with the majority than Austria. The results show that regardless of 
differences among countries in the likelihood to vote with the majority, the length of 
membership has a positive influence on the levels of voting cohesion. The results 
support the hypothesis that EU membership leads to more cohesive voting 
behaviour, due to socialization. 
 Kirsten Lucas 
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Hypothesis 6: transaction costs 
 
The last hypothesis that will be tested is based on constructivism as well and concerns 
the influence of institutional reforms on EU voting cohesion. Constructivists believe 
that the structures in which states interact are important and shape behaviour. When 
there are institutional reforms that make coordination among, for example, EU 
member states easier and states become ‘socialized’, constructivists believe that 
cohesion levels should increase.45 Therefore, I have tested the following hypothesis: 
 
H6: transaction costs hypothesis: The more powerful the coordination apparatus of 
the Union, the lower the transactions costs and thus the higher the levels of voting 
cohesion. 
 
I would like to point out that the coordination  apparatus, as developed through 
Treaty reforms, is not only relevant to achieve cohesion among the  EU  member 
states, but it can also be used to achieve cohesive action with other states such as 
the United States. 
 
Three treaty reforms in the historical development of EU foreign policy could have 
seriously affected its coordination apparatus and thus EU voting cohesion. First, the 
Treaty of Maastricht  established  a  Common Foreign and Security Policy  and 
coordination was made easier through several instruments such as the introduction 
of common positions and joint actions. A second reform concerns the Treaty of 
Amsterdam which introduced  the position of High Representative (HR). The third 
reform is the  Treaty of Lisbon, in which the  HR  has gained more power and the 
European External Action Service (EEAS) has come into place. Again, I have created 
dummy variables, in which the period before the Maastricht reforms is coded as 0 
because it is the reference category. The dummy variables are coded in the 
following way: the period up to the reforms is coded as 0, afterwards it is coded as 1. 
In order to find out whether the size of the EU matters or whether each of the 
institutional reforms have had a significant effect on the level of EU voting cohesion, I 
have run linear regression analyses. Again, there is a multicollinearity problem, but 
the rest of the assumptions were satisfied for both ways of measuring. The results of 
the regression are presented in Tables 7 and 8. 
 
                                                 
45 K. Smith, “Speaking with one voice?”, op.cit., pp. 115-116. EU Diplomacy Papers 7/2012 
  23 
Table 7: Regression analysis on 
institutional reforms (abstain as 0.5) 
  B 
Year  0.440 
(0.327) 
Maastricht 
reforms 
18.167** 
(4.472) 
Amsterdam 
reforms 
2.717 
(4.161) 
Lisbon reforms  -4.501 
(5.206) 
Constant  -821.226 
(649.626) 
R-Squared  0.137 
Notes: Main entries are unstandardized 
coefficients; robust standard errors are in 
parentheses. 
N=1258, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01 
 
Table 8: Regression analysis on 
institutional reforms (abstain as 0) 
 
  B 
Year  1.722** 
(0.234) 
Maastricht 
reforms 
22.301** 
(3.192) 
Amsterdam 
reforms 
-11.318** 
(2.970) 
Lisbon reforms  -12.608** 
(3.716) 
Constant  -3466.082 
(463.734) 
R-Squared  0.448 
Notes: Main entries are unstandardized 
coefficients; robust standard errors are in 
parentheses. 
N=1258, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01 
Source: author’s compilation 
 
When the abstain-votes  are  coded as 0.5, only the Maastricht reforms seem to 
significantly predict voting cohesion levels. Other reforms do not have a significant 
influence on voting cohesion. Moreover, any change in the level of voting cohesion 
cannot be seen as a time effect since the variable ‘year’ was not significant. 
 
However, when the abstain-votes  are  coded as ‘no’, there seems to be a time 
effect. For each year, EU voting cohesion levels increase with 1.722. Institutional 
reforms also have influence on voting cohesion, even though the direction is 
different. The Maastricht reforms seem to have led to higher levels of voting 
cohesion, while the findings suggest that the Amsterdam reforms have led to lower 
levels of voting cohesion. The Lisbon reforms also have  a  significant  negative 
influence, although one should bear into mind that it will probably take a few more 
years before the effects of the reforms become fully visible. 
 
Because of the multicollinearity problem, the results have to be interpreted with a 
certain caution. Regardless of how the abstain-votes  are  coded, the Maastricht 
reforms had a positive significant influence on voting cohesion. When the abstain-
votes are coded as no-votes, the Amsterdam and Lisbon reforms have explanatory 
power. However, the direction of the influence is not in line with my expectations. 
With the introduction of the reforms of the Amsterdam and the Lisbon Treaties, the 
level of EU voting cohesion has decreased. While I expected that the transaction Kirsten Lucas 
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costs would decrease with an increasing coordination apparatus, the Amsterdam 
and Lisbon reforms have actually made it more difficult to come to an agreement. A 
possible explanation for this finding could, again, be the ‘ceiling effect’. Moreover, 
the actual effect of the Lisbon Treaty might not yet be known. 
 
Conclusion: what matters for voting cohesion 
 
This paper has examined the extent and reasons of EU-US voting cohesion in the 
United Nations General Assembly. I have tested six possible explanatory factors of EU-
US voting cohesion. It is important to bear in mind that I have not only studied 
cohesive voting behaviour between the United States and the European Union, but I 
have also tried to explain why EU member states reach voting cohesion.  
 
To explain EU-US voting cohesion, I have identified four potential explanatory factors: 
the issues voted upon, whether an issue is marked as ‘important’, whether a 
resolution is ‘new’ or a so-called ‘repeat resolution’ and whether it matters who is the 
President of the US. To explain EU voting cohesion, I analyzed the effects of the 
length of Union membership and of relevant institutional reforms. To test these six 
factors, I have looked at voting behaviour in the UNGA on both high politics 
(security) and low politics (human rights) issues. All the relevant UN resolutions in the 
period between 1980 and 2011 were manually selected on the basis of keywords. 
With the selection of resolutions, a new data set was created and the voting 
cohesion levels on all those resolutions were calculated, using both the method in 
which the abstain-votes were treated as abstentions and the method in which the 
abstain-votes were treated as a ‘no’. After this, independent t-tests were performed 
to find out whether the issues voted upon, the marking of an issue as ‘important’ or 
the nature of a  resolution have any  influence on the level of voting cohesion. 
Moreover, linear regressions were run to analyze the influence of the American 
President on voting cohesion and to study at the EU level whether the institutional 
reforms have had a positive effect on voting cohesion levels. Finally, logistic 
regressions were run to find out whether  the  length of membership of the Union 
impacts on EU voting cohesion. 
 
The results of all these analyses indicate that to explain EU-US voting cohesion, the 
issues voted upon, the ‘important’ label and the type of resolutions matter. On the EU 
level, both the length of membership and the institutional reforms have explanatory 
power.  First, the issue area  hypothesis is partially supported. With both ways of EU Diplomacy Papers 7/2012 
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measuring, voting cohesion is higher on low politics issues than on high politics issues. 
However, when the abstain-votes  are  coded as no-votes, the assumption of 
homogeneity of variances was violated and, therefore, the results have to be taken 
with care. Second, the hypothesis of salience is partially supported. Voting cohesion 
is higher on ‘important’ issues than on not important issues. Again, though, the 
assumption of homogeneity of variances was violated, which could  possibly be 
explained by the number of years that were missing and the unbalanced number of 
important and non-important issues. Third, I have tested whether the type of 
resolutions matter. The results indicate that voting cohesion is weaker  on annual 
resolutions than on issues that are ‘new’. Fourth, the results indicate that the ’blame 
Bush’  hypothesis has to be rejected. Under Bush jr., voting cohesion was  likely to 
increase instead of decrease, although one has to take the multicollinearity problem 
into account.  
 
Besides studying EU-US voting cohesion, I have  analyzed EU voting cohesion. The 
results support the hypothesis that the longer a country is a member of the Union, the 
more likely it is to vote along with the majority. The final hypothesis that I have tested 
focused on transaction costs. The Maastricht reforms had a positive significant 
influence on voting cohesion. When the abstain-votes  are  coded as ‘no’, the 
Amsterdam and Lisbon reforms have explanatory power. Hence, the hypothesis that 
the reforms have led to higher levels of voting cohesion, due to more coordination, is 
only partially supported. 
 
There are some interesting scientific and societal implications of my findings. Previous 
research46 has shown that the issues voted upon do not explain why EU member 
states vote together or not. When looking at EU-US voting cohesion, though, the 
variable does have significant explanatory power. This might be an indication that 
the United States and the European Union do indeed have very different security 
strategies.47 Moreover, another known area of disagreement in transatlantic relations 
is the death penalty. Every year, the UNGA votes on the moratorium of the death 
penalty, and the countries of the European Union are always in favour, while the 
United States is a strong opponent. Again, it shows that whether an issue is 
repeatedly voted upon does not influence the levels of EU-US voting cohesion. What 
does seem to matter though, is whether the US has marked the issue as important. 
The EU is more likely to vote along with the United States on those issues, which shows 
                                                 
46 Lucas, 2011, op.cit. 
47 Kagan, op.cit. Kirsten Lucas 
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that the diplomatic pressure and persuasion of the US on the EU is successful. Another 
remarkable finding is the fact that Bush jr. did not have a negative effect on voting 
cohesion levels, but neither did Clinton. This makes my study an interesting first step to 
analyze the influence of a US President in general on foreign policy and in relations 
with other states. At the EU level, my results support the idea of socialization and also 
show that this process takes time. It would be an interesting suggestion for further 
research to analyze how this process exactly takes place. 
 
Overall, the prospects for EU-US agreement are not bleak. In the UNGA there are 
high levels of voting cohesion. This is even the case on security issues, despite the fact 
that the US and the EU might have different security strategies and strategic outlooks.  
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